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Abstract: Hardware Trojans are one of the serious threats with detrimental, irreparable eﬀects on the functionality,
security, and performance of digital integrated circuits. It is diﬃcult to detect Trojans because of their diversity in
size and performance. While the majority of current methods focus on Trojan detection during chip testing, run-time
techniques can be employed to gain unique advantages. This paper proposes a method based on the online scalable
detection technique, which eliminates the need for a reference chip. Involving local detectors, this technique assesses
the variations in the logical values of each node to find out whether there are Trojans. This method excludes time
and power measurements, which are common parameters in most conventional methods. The detectors provide Trojanlocalization capability in our proposed technique. Two remarkable features of this technique are low power and low area
overhead. The results are reported by simulation and implementation of common benchmarks, which show the high
Trojan detection rate of the proposed method.
Key words: Hardware Trojans, run-time method, local detectors, detection, localization

1. Introduction
Hardware Trojans (HTs) pose a serious threat to the security and accuracy of electronic systems because they
can manipulate the functionality of the system by adding or removing a component in the circuit. Trojans may
activate in specific working or environmental circumstances, leaving destructive eﬀects such as piracy and illegal
data transfer [1–3]. Trojan detection takes place in 3 phases during the lifecycle of a chip: during design time,
test time, and run time [4]. Design-time methods usually support the run-time methods. There are significantly
fewer run-time methods than the others, even though they bring about the following great advantages [4]: first,
if the Trojan is not active during testing, the test-time method fails in detection. Second, a chip whose Trojan
has not been activated will function similar to an intact Trojan-free chip. Working perfectly and eﬀectively,
the run-time method can initially detect a Trojan, bypass it, and prevent it from penetrating into the entire
chip. With respect to the characteristics of HTs and the problems found in the current detection methods, this
paper intendeds to propose an alternative technique. The proposed method is run-time. HTs are identified by
measuring the logical values of the circuit nodes. There are several outstanding advantages of the proposed
method: 1- Trojan detection does not require a reference chip or Golden IC. 2- Unlike conventional methods,
it does not require power and delay to be measured. 3- Process variations and noise do not aﬀect this method.
4- It provides an online, fast, low-cost, and scalable solution. 5- It is capable of localizing Trojans. 6- The
proposed method oﬀers a high detection rate and low overhead. This paper is organized as follows: the next
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section reviews the relevant literature. The proposed method is described in Section 3. Section 4 provides the
simulation and experimental results. Finally, the conclusions are given in Section 5.
2. Literature review
In general, Trojan detection methods can be categorized as side channel analysis, run-time, Trojan activation,
and logical testing methods [2]. The proposed method falls under logical testing, which is run-time. Therefore,
it is crucial to review similar studies on categorization of detection methods. A suspiciously malicious circuit
activity can be revealed by monitoring the gates that have not been triggered by the circuit inputs. Known as
VeriTrust, this method is implemented at design time [5]. This method is mainly characterized by its insensitivity
to how Trojans are implemented. There is another method known as blue chip [6], in which a dynamic method
has been developed through software–hardware integration. It can detect all Trojan-aﬀected circuits through
unused circuit identification techniques. In [7], a method was proposed to detect Trojan intrusion by extracting
a Trojan netlist, without relying on a golden netlist. It provides a classification of Trojan-free and Trojan-active
netlists through scoring. In [8], Waksman checked the IP security with a tool known as FANCI. Involving
static detection, this method is implemented at design time. Gates with a low probability of malicious activity
are flagged as suspicious and Trojan-aﬀected. There is another Trojan detection technique at IP level known
as diversity-duplication [9]. The term ‘duplication’ refers to 2 copies of an IP (original and fake) applied in
the SOC. This idea can oﬀer more than 100% area and power consumption redundancy. In this regard, other
studies focused on IP level, including [10]. There are additional methods to detect Trojans based on run-time
techniques. For instance, detectors are used on the chip area. In such methods, several detectors are embedded
in the circuit to measure a specific metric online. The results of measurements indicate whether or not the
circuit has been exposed to a Trojan attack. Current, voltage, time, and temperature are common metrics
that can be used as a scale of measurement and assessment for detectors. Although these metrics are to a large
extent similar to side-channel techniques, the major diﬀerence is the absence of the Golden IC, which falls under
an independent category. The following section briefly explores various types of sensors: 1) Sensors embedded
in a circuit or chip that can measure current variations. These sensors were employed in [11]. In this method,
Trojans are detected by measuring the local currents. 2) Embedding sensors in the circuit or chip capable of
measuring time variations (delay). Such sensors were employed in [3]. In this type, certain paths of the circuit
are selected and the respective delays are measured. 3) Embedding sensors in the circuit or chip capable of
detecting Trojans by measuring temperature variations. This method was employed in [4]. 4) Another method
revolves around the comparison of instantaneous voltage and current [12]; however, that study did not report
the numerical result of success rate or overhead. There are other papers focusing on online Trojan detection,
where the algorithms perform diﬀerently from that of the proposed technique. In our method, the detectors
include logic gates distributed at the chip area. Logical detectors placed in the empty area of the chip are used
to minimize the chances of Trojan involvement. In terms of type and diversity, these gates are quite similar
to the main gates. In this scenario, if the gates are manipulated, variations can easily be discovered. This
technique actually enhances the possibility of Trojan detection.
3. Proposed method
The proposed method has been implemented through the following algorithm: 1) The main circuit is divided into
subcircuits (smaller segments) at the design stage. In each segment, subcircuits are built in smaller dimensions,
thus leading to fewer inputs (leveling and segmentation stage in Figure 1). 2) A certain number of nodes are
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selected in each segment. Moreover, the nodes are selected based on a specific idea: for example, the candidate
nodes may oﬀer low controllability and observability, or higher fan-out (selection of the desired nodes stage in
Figure 1). 3) The inputs are specified in each subcircuit or segment and then the input vector is applied to the
circuit. In an N -input subcircuit, 2 N vectors are applied. Every time the input vector is applied to the circuit,
the candidate nodes assume logical values, which are extracted in the target nodes (forming groups containing
the nodes stage and applying the input vector stages in Figure 1). 4) The values obtained for each node are
arranged in 1 row of the matrix (creating a response matrix for the nodes stage in Figure 1). 5) The matrix rows
indicate that nodes with maximum similarity are extracted. Given the similarity of nodes, a logical function is
assigned to the candidate nodes. Meanwhile, the logical circuit corresponding to that function is implemented
(extracting of a function from the matrix stage in Figure 1). 6) This function refers to the logical detector in
the corresponding segment. In normal working mode, this function continuously assumes a specific value, which
will not vary until the Trojan attacks the circuit function (inserting the function into the main circuit stage in
Figure 1). 7) Logical detectors are created similarly for other segments. A circuit signature is defined according
to detector values (defining the signature stage Figure 1). Figure 1 illustrates the proposed algorithm.

Figure 1. Proposed algorithm.

4. Simulation and experimental results
The simulation and implementation involves several benchmarks including ISCAS 85/89/99. There are diﬀerent
types of Trojans [13]. This study involves a Trojan aﬀecting the function of the circuit. The Trojans are defined
as follows. Type 1: The Trojan modifies the circuit gates, altering the circuit’s function. Type 2: The circuit
paths are shortened and the gates are bypassed by the Trojans. Type 3: Trojans attack when adding 1 input
to the current gate of the circuit. Type 4: A set of gates are embedded within the circuit. They are initially
inactive, but are then activated after a while, penetrating the circuit and altering its function.
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4.1. Input selection and segmentation
The circuits come in varying sizes and numbers of input ports. Segmentation tends to be more important in
larger circuits. There are two noteworthy considerations: how to apply logical waveforms to the input ports, and
how to specify the circuit segments and how to subject them to the input waveform. The first problem depends
on the number of input ports in the circuit. If N represents the number of inputs, then there will be 2 N modes
possible for the exhaustive test vector. A larger N involves larger test vectors, where the implementation of it
on the circuit may be impossible. Therefore, the number of input ports should be split up so that an exhaustive
test vector can be applied. The selection threshold for the allowable number of inputs has been assumed to be
12 in such a way that the total number of modes would not surpass 4096. The selection threshold implies that
the maximum number of inputs for 1 segment can be 12, while any lower number will be fine. Basically, N
in each segment should not be too large, because an excessive number of modes will demand time-consuming
analysis. On the other hand, N should not be too small because it may escalate the number of segments. Since
the circuits have varying numbers of input ports, there may be diﬀerent modes as discussed in the following
(N number of input ports): A) N < 12: the input vector can be applied directly to all ports. For example,
the exhaustive test vector is applied to 128 modes when there are 7 input ports, while the circuit has 1 input
segment. B) N > 12 (nearly 12): it can be divided into 2 groups since the number of modes for the exhaustive
test vectors exceeds the threshold value. For example, 2 groups of 7 and 8 are suggested for 15 input ports.
Nevertheless, this categorization is optional, since 5 and 10 or 9 and 6 or any other reasonable combination can
be selected. C) N > 12 (not nearly 12): grouping into a larger number of segments is recommended since the
number of modes for the exhaustive test vector is large. For example, 12, 12, 10, and 6 inputs can be designated
for the 40-input mode. In this scenario, 4 input segments are created. As can be seen, there is a wide variety
of options available to the user according to preferences. However, it is crucial to strike a balance among the
number of segments, size of segments, and user-preferred detection accuracy. When the test vector is applied
to the inputs of a segment, certain nodes of that segment will be triggered by the inputs and assumed logical
values. Having passed through gates, the signals are propagated across a part of the circuit. The ideal nodes
for selection of the next (middle) input segments of the circuit are those nodes where the propagation from the
previous segment is finished, However, it is acceptable to initiate the new segments slightly ahead or behind,
rather than exactly on the propagation end-nodes. This shift will aﬀect the accuracy of detection and overall
circuit overhead. Moreover, it outlines the boundaries of the zone in a circuit where the middle segments and
their input nodes should be embedded. In this section of the circuit, new input ports are virtually defined so
that new input vectors can be applied. The number of inputs in this section of the circuit is similar to the
previous segments following the same methodology. The input applied to new input ports will lead to further
signal propagation to the end of the circuit. The end-nodes of this segment can be used to define and select
new segments. This progresses in the circuit until it reaches the output nodes. If the segment end-nodes are
the same as circuit output ports, the segmentation is completed.
4.2. Matrix extraction
As previously mentioned, when the input is applied, the signals are transmitted in the circuit and trigger certain
nodes, assuming logical values. If a node has value(s) other than 0 and 1, it would probably not be selected.
All triggered nodes with desirable logical values are selected and their values are inserted into a matrix. Each
matrix row represents a node, and each column indicates the logical value of that node. For instance, if a
segment contains 6 inputs, there will be 64 modes in its test vector. If there are 30 nodes triggered by these
vectors, then the matrix will be 30 × 64. The circuit contains diﬀerent segments whose numbers of inputs and
triggered nodes vary. In fact, there are matrices with varying dimensions to be analyzed.
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4.3. Extraction of the desired function
Before this step, a matrix has been constructed. Each row indicates the logical value of a node constructed by
application of diﬀerent inputs. Meanwhile, the rows are compared to each other to extract a logical relationship
and function, based on similarity between the values of rows. It is critical to consider the accuracy and eﬃciency
of relationships. The relationship between 2 rows barely implies desirable applicability. It is desirable that the
logical values of 2 diﬀerent rows be independent. It is more desirable to select 2 diﬀerent paths in a segment,
because the path variation in 1 of them, due to presence of Trojans, can be detected by the other one. The
Trojan detection in this procedure is correlated with identification of variations. If the selected nodes are all
altered exactly in the same way, the diﬀerence will not be detected and the alteration would never be noticed.
In this scenario, it suﬃces to select nodes with minimal interdependence and define the function by adopting a
greater number of nodes. For this end, a program is written to compare the matrix rows and demonstrate the
similarity percentages, i.e. the position of each selected node. When the matrix rows are compared, diﬀerent
modes may occur: A) Two selected nodes are identical: in this case, 2 identical rows are extracted from the
matrix, as shown in Figure 2a. The XOR function can be employed. The XOR value for 2 points is always 0.
In this case, the similarity is 100%. B) Two selected nodes are nonidentical: in this case, 2 rows are logically
opposite to one another. The inequality of the 2 rows has been shown in Figure 2b. In this scenario, the XOR
function can be employed. The XOR value for 2 points is always 1. In this case, the similarity is 100%. The
above 2 modes (A and B) are optimum, because they can extract accurate relationships between the nodes.
C) Two selected nodes are neither identical nor nonidentical: in this case, the equation between 2 rows will be
converted to a function. Nonetheless, this function performs correctly in most cases but not all. For instance,
Figure 2c shows the status of 2 nodes. These nodes are identical in 12 out of 16 possible modes. Hence, the
output of an XOR gate displays the equality correctly in at 75% of cases with a constant value of zero. The
accuracy of this equation between the 2 nodes is therefore 75%. Although this value is always desired to be
100%, there might be cases other than 100%. In all of the above cases (A, B, and C), the function’s output
is constant, i.e. invariably 0 or 1 for the user. Any variation in the logical value of the output will alter the
function output, which in turn leads to Trojan detection.

Figure 2. Details of two rows of the matrix.

4.4. Implementation of the function
Evidently, the relationships in a segment diﬀer from those in the next segment, which in turn diversifies the
functions, i.e. not all extracted functions are necessarily similar. New functions are initially added as a code
(vhdl or Verilog, in this case) and later to the main circuit at gate level. This is completed during the design
stage, prior to circuit manufacturing. In this procedure, new functions are added to check the main circuit.
These checking circuits are basically logical detectors locally embedded in diﬀerent non-preset components of
the circuit. Given that the outputs of new functions are invariably assigned to be either 0 or 1, each segment
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can be associated with a specific output. It is as though each segment leaves its own signature. For example, a
10-segment circuit with each containing a checking function will assume 10 specific binary values. This circuit
can be argued to have a unique 10-bit signature, which can be considered as a 10-bit register checked by the user
during the circuit run-time. Needless to say, this signature may vary from 1 circuit to another, depending on
the definitions of detectors in each circuit. Moreover, every signature contains a diﬀerent number of bits. The
signature of a circuit, however, will remain identical in its normal operation, while it changes in the presence
of a Trojan in the circuit. Figure 3 displays the main circuit, divided into N segments, i.e. N self-examiner
circuits (detectors) are required to detect the HT involvement.

Figure 3. The deployment of proposed HT detectors with N detectors.

4.5. Simulation
Benchmark C499 is selected to demonstrate the simulation details. The algorithm proposed in the previous
section operates as follows: 1) This circuit entails 41 inputs divided through segmentation into 5 subcircuits
with fewer inputs. The desired functions cannot be extracted without segmentation, since the input vector has
2 41 modes, which is impossible to be implemented. The inputs to the first 4 segments are the same as those of
the main circuit. Inputs 1 to 10 are assigned for the 1st segment, inputs 11 to 20 to the 2nd segment, inputs 21
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to 30 to the 3rd segment, and inputs 31 to 41 to the 4th one. Embedded in the middle of the main circuit, the
5th segment is selected independently of the main circuit inputs. Eight inputs are selected for the 5th segment.
It can be argued that a total of 8 to 11 inputs are assigned to the 5 segments, leading to far fewer modes than
41 inputs. The five circuit benchmarks are marked in five diﬀerent colors in Figure 4. The color representation
helps to better specify the coverage of circuit segments across the whole circuit area. 2) When the inputs of
each segment are stimulated, a number of nodes will assume acceptable, logical values in that segment. At this
stage, the nodes are specified in the segment. For instance, the 1st to 5th segments will assume logical values
with 12, 9, 9, 9, and 90 nodes, respectively. 3) The nodes are grouped according to the number of acceptable
nodes in the previous section. All nodes are selected as 1 group because there are only a few favorable nodes
in each group. This can yield more accurate results. 4) The inputs are applied to each segment in addition to
matrix forms for the nodes within each group. 5) The responses are inserted in the matrix assigned to each
segment. The 5th segment, the largest in the circuit, has 8 input nodes. These 8 nodes are selected because of
their higher fan-out. When the input is applied to this segment, the 8 input nodes will be deemed independent
of the main inputs and the connected nodes, on which all testing vector modes will be applied. Oﬀering high
output fan-out, these nodes can stimulate 90 nodes. Therefore, the 5th segment with 90 × 256 matrix specifies
the function. 6) Based on our proposed method, a logic circuit is assigned to each matrix. The circuit defined
in each segment is implemented in the same zone. Hence, five separate circuits should be defined in the original
benchmark. In Figure 5, each circuit is included in the main benchmark with a distinct color to emphasis the
diﬀerences between them. The outputs of the new function are constantly fixed in the Trojan-free mode. Hence,
the outputs of the 5 circuits can be used as a signature to verify the circuit. As the detectors are embedded in
the main circuit, the chip area and power consumption begin to vary. Table 1 displays the values before and
after the involvement of detectors in 0.18-µ m technology.
Table 1. Area and power overhead in benchmarks.

Benchmark
S298
C499
C6288
S38417

Area (µm2 )
Main
Modified
1490.22 1497.7
3525.98 3702.5
17,550
18,778.5
87,085
95,793.5

Power (µW)
Main
Modified
91
91.45
1870
1907.4
14,000
14,700
132,000 142,560

4.6. The number of segments
As shown in segmentation of C499 (Figure 4) there is a scenario where all gates may not fall in the circuit
segmentation. The question at this point is whether or not the engagement of more segments will enhance the
detection accuracy. This is evaluated for C499 in 2 scenarios. The 1st scenario involves 5 segments. The next
scenario involves a 10 segments. Figure 6 shows the extra segmentations. The involvement of more segments
will include the gates not segmented in the 1st stage. On the other hand, increasing the number of segments
puts some gates in more than 1 segment. The number of detectors doubles as the number of segments doubles.
By the same token, the Trojan detection rate is expected to double. Simulations suggest an increase in the
Trojan detection rate, even though it is less than the expected rate. This can be explained by dependence
and sharing between segments. Among all segments added, there are a few segments functioning completely
independently of the others. They are called eﬀective segments, where the embedded detectors cover a large
1409
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Figure 4. C499 segmentations (segments 1–5).

area of the circuit. The presence of eﬀective segments can strengthen the detection capability. Hence, the
performance of this method is not enhanced necessarily by embedding a greater number of segments. This will
not only improve performance but will escalate area and power overhead.
4.7. Trojan detection accuracy
Having been designed, the detectors need to be assessed in terms of Trojan detection accuracy. For that purpose,
it is essential to calculate the success threshold. The success threshold implies the number of variations in the
main circuit required by the detector to detect Trojans in a segment. For instance, the variations within a
segment might be detected on 1 gate in the 1st type of Trojans, where the number of gates changes randomly.
The variations in the next 2 segments will be detected for 3 and 10 gates, respectively. This number varies
for each segment of the circuit, which is true for other types of Trojans. The proposed equation (Eq. (1)) for
detection accuracy in the new technique is as follows:
P = (PSegment ) (PMatrix ) (PFunction )

(1)

Here P Segment is the ratio of the number of gates embedded in the circuit segmentation to the total number of
gates. P Matrix represents the probability of obtaining the desired function according to the matrix extracted
in each segment. P Function : Four types of Trojans are included in the simulation. A definition is given to each
of the 4 types of Trojans below. Then P Function is obtained through a new equation. P T1 : The detection
1410
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Figure 5. Implemented functions in segments.

probability of Trojan type 1 is resulted byM times of simulation obtained from Eq. (2). Pk(n) represents the
detection probability when alteration is found in n gates of the circuit.
PT 1 =

1 ∑M
Pk (n)
k=1
M

(2)

P T2 : The detection probability of Trojan type 2 is resulted byM times of simulation obtained from Eq. (3).
P k (s) is the Trojan detection probability where s gates have become short-circuited.
PT 2 =

1 ∑M
Pk (s)
k=1
M

(3)

P T3 : The detection probability of Trojan type 3 is resulted byM times of simulation obtained from Eq. (4).
Pk(r) represents the detection probability when alteration is found in the number of inputs in r gates of the
1411
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Figure 6. Extra segments in C499.

circuit.
PT 3 =

1 ∑M
Pk (r)
k=1
M

(4)

P T4 : The detection probability of Trojan type 4 is resulted byM times of simulation obtained from Eq. (5).
P k( t) represents the detection probability in a circuit to which t gates have been added within a given time.
PT 4 =

1 ∑M
Pk (t)
k=1
M

(5)

After calculating P T 1 , P T 2 , P T 3 , and P T 4 , the minimum value is selected as P Function based on Eq. (6).
PF unction = min (PT j ) (j = 1, 2, 3, 4)

(6)

The algorithm for the above calculation is shown in Figure 7. Prior to reading the success rate, the
values of n, s, r , and t in the circuit should be obtained. Several tests are conducted on diﬀerent segments of
benchmark C499 and values of n = 5, s = 3, r = 3, and t = 5 are introduced as the success threshold. The
diagrams in Figure 8 display the success rate of detecting various Trojans. Having calculated the success rates
in diﬀerent states, the minimum value in each segment will be selected.
4.8. Results
Considering the number of eﬀective segments and the optimized design of detectors, a perfect simulation is
conducted on the 5 benchmarks. Table 2 displays the results for 180-nm technology along with full specifications.
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Figure 7. Accuracy calculation algorithm.
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Figure 8. Eﬀect of (n, s, r, t) on detection probability.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the success rate of the method is 80% in the worst case. Assuming the
detection percentage is a weighted average, however, the detection capability will exceed 90%. The proposed
method has been simulated by Mentor ModelSim and Synopsys Design Compiler, using 45-, 180-, and 250-nm
technologies. The accuracy of these simulations demonstrates the scalability of the proposed method. This
also includes the calculations of power and area. Simulations are then conducted by applying noise and process
variations. The accuracy at this stage proves that the method is not aﬀected by noise and PV. The hardware
verification is performed on a FPGA-platform, where FPGA is employed to simulate ASIC scenarios. The
advantage of this method is that Trojans with diﬀerent sizes and types are checked through diﬀerent benchmarks.
The selected FPGA is by XILINX-SPARTAN6. The results were seen using a 100-MHz oscilloscope. Moreover,
we used a LED to show the presence/absence of Trojan in the test circuit, as shown in Figure 9. Certain ports
were assigned to the FPGA for sensors embedded in the circuit so that Trojan detection and localization could
be completed through separate examination of each port.
Table 2. Results of simulations.

Benchmark
S298
C499
C6288
S38417

# of
gates
119
202
2416
22179

# of
FFs
14
1636

# of
inputs
3
41
32
28

# of
outputs
6
32
32
106

Power
overhead
0.5%
2%
5%
8%

Area
overhead
0.5%
5%
7%
10%

Probability
(detection rate)
100%
100%
85%
80%

#: Number, FFs: flipflops.

5. Discussion
5.1. A few features of the new technique
This section explores several features of the new technique: 1) Even when a Trojan is active in the circuit, it is
crucial to detect it online as well. Eﬀort should be made to avoid a Trojan activation or neutralize it through
1413
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Figure 9. The output results.

preventive measures. Trojan activation in a circuit is similar to unusual operations in an ALU, such as division
by zero or when 2 large numbers are included, giving rise to overflow. The CPU will never stop in any of these
scenarios, although this operation is incorrect. As the CPU signals a warning, the ALU makes a decision on
the event as the normal operation resumes. Therefore, online detection can prevent Trojan activation and a
malfunction from spreading throughout the chip. 2) One advantage of this method is localization. The SOCs
often involve IPs supplied by various manufacturers. If Trojans intrude upon a specific IP, localization helps
the user easily find the Trojan source. This also facilitates the convenient tracking and identifying of Trojans.
Moreover, Trojans can be prevented from spreading all over the area by isolating the surface of a Trojan-aﬀected
chip. In some occasions, a given section of the chip can be switched on or oﬀ. 3) This technique will, with 100%
certainty, detect any Trojan attack against the detectors embedded in the main circuit. Detectors have diﬀerent
logic functions and are placed in diﬀerent sections of the circuit. Therefore, they are distributed similarly to
other gates and cannot be easily detected. Moreover, their outputs can be defined diﬀerently. For instance, if
there are several subcircuits, the correct output can be designated to be 1 for a few and 0 for the rest. The
1414
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Table 3. Area and power overhead in diﬀerent methods.

Ref
This work
[10]
[18]

Year
2017
2017
2016

[16]

2016

[11]
[17]
[14]
[15]
[3]

2014
2014
2014
2013
2012

1

Technique
Logical detectors
Trust Filter
Weighted random pattern
TPAD (hardware Trojan
prevention and detection)
Current sensors
Insertion MUX
Delay fingerprint
Camouflaging 1
Thermal sensors

Overhead (area/power)
0.5%/10%
0.5%/8%
1.7%/6.45%
10.26%
9.5%
7.4%/165%

-

0.5%/8%
0.3%/32%
19%/26%
5.5X
10%/15%

0.1%/2%
0.6%/45%
4X
-

5.5X implies a 5.5-fold increase of overhead, 4X implies a four-fold increase of overhead.

selection and number of circuits depends on the designer’s preferences. A unique signature can be created by the
outputs, reflecting the accurate performance of the circuit. Therefore, the proposed method can be employed
to prevent a new pin at the output, which might change the overall structure of the chip. If an implemented
function is deleted or altered, the function will change, revealing the Trojans. 4) The consumption area overhead
created by the involvement of detectors can be lowered, even though it is not a major problem. Although adding
hardware components to the main circuit will expand the chip area, there are ideas to minimize that. The free
spaces in the circuit layout can host Trojans. The proposed circuits can be laid out in the free spaces so as to
both utilize the dead-space of the chip and curtail the area overhead [1,3]. In this paper, the overhead had a
normal value. The figures reported for diﬀerent detection methods [3,10,11,14–18] are shown in Table 3.
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes a simple and low-cost Trojan detection technique. It is based on comparing logical values
of sensitive nodes of the circuit at any moment. A signature is defined for the circuit, thus enabling the users
to check the signature as the circuit operates, finding out if the chip has been infected by Trojans or not. A
self-authentication method, i.e. DFT, is conducted. Various types of Trojan attacks can be detected by this
technique, which tends to be scalable, suitable for encountering the eﬀects of noise and process variations. The
increases in area and power overhead have been reported to be 10% and 8% in the worst case, respectively. The
conducted simulations and implementations validate the proposed technique.
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